James Z. Davis (December 16, 1943 - February 27, 2016) is an American judge in the Utah Court of Appeals.
Video James Z. Davis
Early life and education
James "Jim" Z. Davis was born in 1943 in Salt Lake City, Utah. He attended Utah University, graduating with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He received a law degree from the University of Utah College of Law in 1968. After graduating he served in Army military intelligence for two years, ending in 1970. Davis toured as a Combat Intelligence Analyst in Vietnam. Judge Davis retired in November 2015.
Davis died February 27, 2016.
Maps James Z. Davis
Legal career
From 1971-1977 Davis was practicing personally, practicing in Ogden, Utah. In 1973 he became Deputy Attorney Area Weber and Weber District Police Law Adviser. In 1977 he joined the law firm of Ogden, Thatcher, Glasmann, and Davis, where he practiced until 1982. Davis later joined the companies Ray, Quinney and Nebeker in Salt Lake City where he worked as shareholder and director until his appointment to the bench. As a lawyer, Davis focused his practice on Commercial Real Estate, Bankruptcy, and Banking.
Davis was elected President of the Utah State Bar in 1991. Judge Davis was appointed to the Utah Court of Appeal in 1993 by Governor Michael O. Leavitt. He served two years as chairman in January 1999 and currently serves as the presiding judge.
Judicial career
Judge Davis was certified by the Utah Justice Board to maintain retention in 2008 and was detained in office by Utah voters for the third time.
Selected Cases
Utah State v Duhaime 2011 UT App 209
On January 14, 2009, a highway patrolman searched for a drug activity observing Lincoln Town Car with a Texas license plate, driven by Duhaime, traveling east on Interstate 80 in Summit County. The patrolman runs a check on the license plate number and discovers that it is a rental car. The patrol officer claimed that the rear number plate light was not working. He also watched the driver make what the patrolman said as a change of illegal path. At about 11:00 pm, on the pretext of a previous offense, patrolmen pulled the car up. The encounter with Duhaime and his wife (Wife) was captured by a camera in a patrol vehicle.
The patrol officer began questioning Duhaime about the itinerary and concluded that the driver's response was inconsistent and nervously pronounced. Upon returning to the car, the patrol officer summoned another patrolman and ordered him to take the dog sniff car for drugs. Duhaime and his wife were held in plain sight until the dog came. When the dog arrived, the dog told in the trunk of the car, where the officers later found seventy-six marijuana bags weighing a pound. Duhaime was arrested and accused of possessing controlled substances with the intent to distribute, third-degree crimes.
Duhaime filed a motion to suppress marijuana evidence, arguing that the patrol officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop it due to equipment or traffic violations and that the detention was longer than necessary to implement the dismissal purpose. The trial court found that the patrol officer's testimony of the plate lights was credible, that no conflicting testimony was presented, and that it was unclear from the video whether the lamp was working.
On appeal, Judge Davis wrote a court opinion and concluded:
"Trial trials are not wrong in concluding that the dismissal in this case is justified at the outset, and the patrolman's testimony of dismissal is not so unreasonable as to justify his credibility review on appeal, but the totality of the circumstances does not support the reasonable suspicion that Duhaime was carrying drugs, and Duhaime was illegally arrested when he was detained to wait for a drug-detecting dog, so we reversed the court's denial of Duhaime's movement to suppress, and we returned the case to a process consistent with this opinion. "
Utah state v Watkins 2011 UT App 96
In September 2008, Watkins accepted a job with his nephew's husband (Dad). Watkins moved temporarily with his niece (StepMom) and Dad until he was able to get his own place. Three of Father and Sister's daughters stayed with them during the time Watkins lived in their home. In addition, a ten-year-old father's father from a previous relationship (Son) visits the Father and Stepmother "regularly" while Watkins lives with them.
Three years earlier, Watkins lost his son and stepdaughter in a tragic accident. After the accident, his marriage suffered and he and his wife eventually divorced. On about October 15, 2008, Watkins's ex-wife married again. On the same day, the Son stayed at the Father's home last night. Disappointed with the marriage of his ex-wife, Watkins drank a large amount of alcohol while the other three children all slept in his room. After the Child falls asleep, he wakes up to find Watkins in bed by kissing her on the side of his head. He asks her to stop and leave, but then she starts "pinching" or "rubbing" her ass with her hand. The child also testified in court and in his interview that he "flooded his ass." Watkins finally leaves after Child tells him to go a second time, but he then comes back and gives him $ 100, telling him not to tell anyone about the money.
After the incident, the Son no longer wants to visit the Father's house while Watkins is there and after a few weeks, Stepmother asks what's wrong. The Child discloses the details of the incident to her mother, Stepmother, and Dad. The incident was reported and Watkins was arrested.
Watkins is accused of sexually abusing a child, a first-degree crime. In the hearing, after the State rested his case, Watkins moved to fire, arguing that the State had failed to prove that he was in a special position of trust with respect to the child he had shown with "the intention to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of everyone." refuses motion to dismiss. The jury punished Watkins and he was sentenced to ten years in prison for life.
On appeal, Judge Davis wrote a court opinion and concluded:
"The court did no wrong by denying Watkins motion to be dissolved because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find both that he was in a special position of trust with respect for the Son and that he had the intentions necessary to awaken or satisfy his sexual desires. In addition, made no mistake in rejecting Watkins's motion for a new trial because the text message between the Stepmother and the Sister did not support the theory put forward in court, did not indicate that the Stepmother had lied to her testimony, where the cumulative evidence was presented in court, and was not probable sexual intentions, therefore we affirm. "
Commonwealth Property v Mortgage Electric 2011 UT App 232
A home buyer (House Buyers) executes a promissory note (Notes) in favor of his lender (loan) of $ 417,000 guaranteed under the terms of the Deed of Trust which describes the property in Eagle Mountain, Utah, as collateral for the debt. The Trust Deed identifies MERS as a "successor to Lenders and Lenders and assigns" and as "beneficiaries under this Security Instrument." In the preliminary note, the Lender relinquishes his service rights to Citi, which at the same time remains the Notes and the Home Buyers make payments. Home Buyers fail on Notes, and on approximately December 8, 2009, the Trustee's Successor to the Trust Deed recorded Notice of Default and Election to Sell.1 On December 6, 2009, MERS handed over a "favorable interest" to Citi, recorded on January 6 2010. As of December 31, 2009, the deed ceased to be recorded where the Buyer of the House transferred its interest in the Eagle Mountain property to the CPA.
The CPA filed a complaint in February 2010 stating the four causes of the action based on its assertion that the Deed of Trust was separated from the Notes shortly after being executed and therefore and "unable to be upheld by the defendant [s]" for some time.
MERS and Citi moved to refuse a CPA complaint, stating that the CPA argument "that transferring records guaranteed by the trust deed as part of securities transactions makes the record of unsafe obligations... has no legal support and fails as a matter of law." In its memorandum verdict, the district court changed the motion to be dismissed in unanimity due to what it established as proof of foreign documents attached to the plea of ​​both parties. ("[A] movement to dismiss 'should be changed to one for a brief assessment if matters outside the defense are presented and not excluded by the court.'" (Citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12 (b))). The district court then provides a summary verdict supporting the MERS and Citi. In making the decision, the district court ruled that "[t] the underlying premise of each of the causes of [BPA] action is a statement that the Defendant lost the right to begin the process of seizure of property when the Note was 'securitization.' The district court subsequently characterized this underlying principle as a "covert assumption," and found that "the express provisions of the Trust Deed are inexorably stated that MERS has the right to confiscate the Property, even if [the Lender] sells the Note." The CPA moved into reconsideration on the ground that the conversion from movement to dismissal into a movement for an inappropriate summary assessment. The district court rejected the CPA motion to reconsider. The CPA is now appealed from the final summary counting order, reiterating that the district court's conversion of the movement was to cancel into a motion because the summary judgment was not appropriate. The CPA requested that we reverse and return with instructions to the district court to refuse MERS and Citi's motion to dismiss based on his assertion that "the underlying principle" - that the securitization stripped MERS and Citi of the right to begin the foreclosure process at Eagle Mountain. property - is a factual statement.
Judge Davis offers an opinion from the court:
The CPA "basic principle" that securitization has deprived MERS and Citi rights as expressly stated in the Deed of Trust is a false legal statement. So even if the district court does not change the movements of the defendants to cancel into a motion for the summary decision, its decision on the movement to dismiss will produce the same result - the dismissal of the CPA case. In other words, any alleged error in altering the movement is harmless. Therefore, we affirm the district court order to reject the CPA complaint.
Bud Bailey Construction, Inc. v Cache Valley Bank 2011 UT App 149
On April 3, 2006, Bud Bailey received an assessment of Construction Associates, Inc., for $ 46,919.79. On November 1, 2006, Bud Bailey served a lawsuit against an administrative assistant at the Bank. The letter was accompanied by an interrogator providing space for the Bank's response. The Bank's response, filed with the court indicates that the Bank holds $ 17,901,94 in the Construction Account's checking account. One of the interrogators stated, "You are deducting from the amount that you must deduct the money you received from the defendant or the plaintiff, if the amount is not debated.If you make this deduction, state the deducted amount and the person's name is indebted to you." the Bank's answer to this question is left blank.
According to the 64D rule of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, court instructions in the garnishment warrant, the Bank is responsible for sending funds to Bud Bailey if it does not receive a request to hear from the Construction Associate within twenty days. When Bud Bailey had not received the funds on January 25, 2007, the court court issued Garnishee Order to Show Cause in reuth for the Bank's failure to comply with the order.
The Bank's advice then told Bud Bailey and the court that the Bank had placed the lien on the fund and that it would provide the court with "an appropriate response to the sentence." On the day of the hearing on the order of cause of the show, the Bank filed its Response to Garnet and Order to indicate the reason in contempt, claiming the right to compensate the funds to meet more than $ 300,000 in unpaid loans made by the Bank for Construction. Linking and providing documents proving its security interests in a checking account. The trial continued the trial until April 2, 2007. Bud Bailey later found out that the Construction Associate had deposited additional funds into his giro account after the withdrawal letter was issued and that the Bank had allowed the Construction Associate to withdraw the funds.
In an order issued May 9, 2007, the trial court found that the Bank was not in compliance with the garnishment law and that it failed to provide notice of the offset of the right to compensate within the required timeframe. The court further found that the Bank violated a court order contained in the warrant by allowing checks taken from funds deposited after a statement of punishment issued for cleaning rather than using them to pay for garnishment. As a result, the court ordered the Bank to pay the entire amount remaining on the withholding, $ 38,769,71, as well as lawyer fees Bud Bailey.
The bank appealed, admitting that it had been erroneous by failing to claim offsets in its response to interrogatories but argued that the cutting article does not apply to deposited funds. The Court agreed, stating that "the Writ of Garnishment only affects the funds held by the Bank at the time of writing, but we submit instructions to the court to make" determination as to what amount, if any, the Bank should be required to pay solely for his failure to adequately answer the interrogations presented with Writ. "
In detention, the trial found that the Bank had "failed to provide sufficient justification for its failure to respond well to Bud Bailey's interrogation of offsets." The trial court found that the amount sufficient to rate the bank for its failure was the full amount it held for the Construction Partner at the time Bud Bailey served the garnation warrant plus the attorney's fees. Bank appeal.
Judge Davis offered an opinion from the court and concluded:
Trial trial was mistaken in judging a penalty against the Bank for failure to correctly answer the interrogation. In addition, the court did not make factual findings to support the assessment of liabilities to the Bank for any sums beyond attorney's fees arising as a result of Bank's mistakes. Finally, the appropriate award of attorney's fees to Bud Bailey is not limited to the costs incurred before the Bank notifies Bud Bailey of his mistake. We reverse and ask the court to conduct a new verification session to determine the amount of damage, if any; to reassess the cost of attorneys' fees; and to determine the exact amount of attorneys' fees, which Bud Bailey has the right to appeal. "
References
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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