Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410 (2006), is a US Supreme Court decision involving the protection of free speech First Amendment for government employees. The plaintiff in the case is a county attorney who claims that he has been passed for promotion for criticizing the legitimacy of a warrant. The Court decided, in decision 5-4, that since the statements were made in accordance with its position as a public employee, and not as a private citizen, his speech had no protection of the First Amendment.
Video Garcetti v. Ceballos
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Richard Ceballos has been employed since 1989 as deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Prosecutors Office, which was then led by Gil Garcetti. After defense lawyers in pending criminal cases contact Ceballos about a motion to challenge a critical search warrant based on inaccuracies in supporting statements, Ceballos conducts his own investigation and establishes that written statements contain serious misrepresentation. Ceballos contacted the sheriff's deputy who had sworn a written statement but was dissatisfied with his explanation. Ceballos then communicated his findings to his superiors and submitted a memorandum in which he recommended the cancellation of the case. A meeting was later held to discuss a written statement with superiors and officials from the sheriff's department, which Ceballos claimed to be hot and accused his role in handling the case. Despite Ceballos concerns, his boss decided to continue prosecution. The trial of the criminal trial held a trial of the movement, in which Ceballos was summoned by the defense to retell his observations of the declaration. The court has denied the motion and reinforced the warrant.
Ceballos claims that he later undergoes a series of retaliatory work actions. This includes reassignment to a different position, moving to another court building, and promotional refusal. He started a job complaint, which was denied on the basis of his findings that he was not retaliated.
District Court Process
Ceballos then brought the 1983 claim section in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, confirming that his supervisor violated the First Amendment by replying to the memo. His supervisor claimed that there was no retaliation, that the change in his work was dictated by a legitimate staffing officer, and that regardless, the Ceballos memo was not a constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment. The District Court granted their motion for the summary ruling, concluding that because Ceballos wrote his memos based on his job duties, he was not entitled to the protection of the First Amendment for the contents of the memo. Alternatively, he decided that even if he had a protected right to speak in this context, the right was unclear and the immunity so strongly applied to his superiors' actions.
Decision of the Court of Appeal
At the appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that his criticism of the warrant in the memo was a protected speech under the First Amendment. The Court applied the analysis set out in the precedent of the Supreme Court to see whether the expression in question was made by the speaker "as a citizen of the public concern." Because his memos relate to what he thinks to be the government's misbehavior, the court believes that the subject "is inherently a matter of public concern." However, the court did not evaluate whether it was made in the capacity of Ceballos as a citizen because of the Ninth Circuit precedent stating that the First Amendment applies to statements made on the basis of employment obligations.
Having concluded that the Ceballos memo fulfilled the requirements of public concern, the Court of Appeal continued to balance Ceballos's interest in his speech against his superiors' interest in responding to it. The court reached a balance in favor of Ceballos, noting that his superiors had "failed even to suggest interference or inefficiency in the work of the DA's Office" as a result of the memo. The Court further concluded that Ceballos's First Amendment right was clearly established and that the applicant's action made no sense objectively.
Judge Diarmuid Fionntain O'Scannlain agreed that the panel's decision was imposed by the Circuit precedent. But he concluded that the Circuit should be reviewed and rejected: "When government officials speak in carrying out their routines, the necessary work obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of the speech that gives rise to First Amendment rights."
Maps Garcetti v. Ceballos
Court Opinion
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, which ruled in a 5-4 decision submitted by Justice Anthony Kennedy that the First Amendment did not prevent employees from discipline for the expression they made in accordance with their professional duties. The case has been returned after Judge Sandra Day O'Connor's retirement, because the decision was bound without her; his successor, Judge Samuel Alito, then broke up the relationship.
Four dissenting judges, in three disagreements written by Judges John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer, disputed the majority line against the First Amendment which had applied a speech made in the public sphere of work, arguing that the government's interest which is stronger in this context can be accommodated by a regular equilibrium test.
Kennedy majority opinion
The court wrote that "the precedent does not support the existence of the constitutional cause of the actions behind any statements made by public employees in performing their duties." In contrast, public employees do not speak as citizens when they speak to fulfill their job responsibilities.
Although the speech in question concerns the issue of his work, and is expressed in his office rather than publicly, the Court does not consider any of the facts, and notes that employees in one context may receive protection of the First Amendment. The "controlling factor" is that his statement is made in accordance with his duties as deputy district attorney. Limiting such a speech, which "owes its existence to the professional responsibilities of public employees," does not in the Court's view violate any rights that the employee has as a private citizen. Instead, the restriction is merely the control that the employer does "on what the employer has or has made".
The court found that Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he wrote memos that discussed the proper disposition of pending criminal cases; he instead acts as a government employee. "The fact that his job sometimes requires him to speak or write does not mean his supervisor is forbidden to evaluate his performance." The Court believes that these results are consistent with its precedents regarding public-protected speech, as the limitation of First Amendment claims is based on "government employee work products," because the Court marks the speech in question, will not prevent the employee from participating in public debates.
The court criticized the decision of the Ninth Circuit, which had felt the "doctrinal anomaly" between the tolerance of publicly made employee speech but was not done according to the task given as a result of a misunderstanding of "the theoretical foundation of our decision." The court found an excuse for limiting the protection of the First Amendment to public statements made outside the scope of official duty "because it is the type of activity undertaken by citizens who are not employed by the government."
The court finally dismissed the argument put forward in Judge Souter's opinion that employers may restrict the rights of employees "by creating a job description that is too broad." On the contrary, the Court observes that the formal job description does not always correspond to the expected task, "and the list of tasks given in the employee's written employment description is unnecessary and insufficient to show that carrying out the task is within the scope of the professional duty employee for the purpose of the First Amendment." also provided for future decisions of the problem whether the analysis will apply in the same way to cases involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.
Stevens opinion difference
Judge Stevens made a brief disagreement. Although he agrees with the determination of the majority that a superior can take corrective action against an "inflammatory or misguided" speech, he questions whether the same logic applies to "unwanted speech" which "reveals the fact that supervisors prefer not to find anyone else." Quotes Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District (1979), Judge Stevens explicitly disagrees with the idea that there is a categorical difference between a speech implied by a citizen or by an employee in performing his duties. In Givhan , in charge of an English teacher's problem voiced concern to the principal about the practice of racist schoolwork, the Court did not evaluate whether these concerns were raised in accordance with their job duties. As a result, "our silence [in Givhan ]... shows that the substance is immaterial." Stevens added that it makes no sense for the constitutional protection of the same words to depend on whether they are pronounced as part of one's job duties; In addition, it would be "evil" for the Court to essentially create employee incentives to bypass the channel of resolution set by their employer and voice their concerns directly to the public.
Souter's dissenting opinion
Judge Souter's decision joined Judge Stevens and Judge Ginsburg.
Like Judge Stevens, Souter agrees with the majority that government employers have an active interest in implementing their objectives, and can take appropriate action to ensure the "competence, honesty, and judgment" of its employees. However, he argues that the interest in dealing with official faults and threats to health and safety can defeat the interests of employers, and that in such cases, public employees are eligible for First Amendment protection.
Souter underscores that government employees may often be in the best position to know the problems that exist in their employers' institutions. To quote Givhan, Souter said that under the majority view, British schoolteachers are protected when complaining to the principal about a discriminatory hiring policy, since the policy is not part of the teacher's job description; however, if the school personnel office makes the same complaint, he will not be entitled to the same protection. "It's a strange place to draw a difference," Souter said, especially since the majority, in his view, did not justify the choice of the difference.
Court's decision to qualify for speech protection at Pickering v. Board of Ed. from Township High School Dist. (1968), aims to create a balance that will resolve the tension between individual and public interests in speech on the one hand, and the interests of public entrepreneurs in efficient operations, on the other. Souter writes that the need to balance this competitive need is almost not lost when the employee happens to be talking about issues whose work requires him to be handled. As mentioned in Waters supra , such employees may be very aware of the exact nature of the problem because it is in their job.
Despite sharing a majority concern about employers' interest in maintaining courtesy and competence in the workplace, Souter does not believe that such interest requires the strictest exclusion of First Amendment protection. Indeed, he added, the purpose of most constitutional adjudications is to "deny the demand for the winner-take-all" that has taken place under majority opinion. He also voiced concern that government entrepreneurs will expand the employment description of their employees to further exclude the protection of speeches currently protected by the First Amendment.
Souter outlines two reasons why adjustments in accordance with the Pickering balancing test would be appropriate in this regard. First, the level of the public employer's authority over speech can be predetermined to establish the kind of barrier that employees who are involved in the speech must pass. In this way, an employee who talks about things in his work will not be able to overcome the obstacles unless he speaks "on an unusual problem and meets a high standard of responsibility in the way he does it." In addition, if the incorporation of such a standard fails to prevent powerless action, this problem will be resolved at the conclusion-level.
The second reason quoted by Souter for using Pickering in case in hand is connected with the results of law at the Circuit level. He noted that the protection of the First Amendment is even less limited than the one articulated above has been available in the Ninth Circuit for almost two decades, but the existence of this protection does not result in "weakening the litigation flood" there or in any other Circuit.
Souter also rebuked the majority to accept the false view that any statement made by public employees is, or should be treated as, the government's own speech, because such a view applies only when public employees are employed to promote a particular policy by communicating a particular message. He further disagrees with the majority argument to restrict Pickering's doctrine, stating that First Amendment protection is not necessary given the comprehensive set of state and federal laws that protect government whistles. Souter notes that speeches aimed at official faults may not be protected under the protection of existing laws (eg, Teachers at Givhan will not qualify as whistles).
Finally, Souter also voiced concern about the vast majority of ownership, noting that it was widespread to undermine even the protection of the First Amendment of academic freedom in public universities and universities.
Breyer's dissent
Justice Breyer disagrees with the majority opinion; he also noted that he could not accept Judge Surfer's answer as satisfactory.
Breyer agrees that First Amendment protection can not be universal for speeches of plurality, political speech, or government speech. In the example where the speech of the government employee concerned, First Amendment protection only exists when such protection does not interfere with the interests of the government. In cases where employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern, the speech only receives protection if passing the Pickering balancing test. However, previous cases did not decide what screening tests the judge should use in circumstances where government employees speak about issues of public concern, and speak in the duties of their public employees.
Like Souter, Breyer believes that the majority of people who argue that First Amendment protection does not apply to public employees who speak in accordance with their official duties are too absolute. In the instant case, the speech was a professional speech, as a lawyer put it. Thus, it is also governed by the "professional canon"; these canons contain the obligation to speak in certain cases. In cases where this happens, the government's interest in banning the speech is reduced.
In addition, Breyer writes that the Constitution itself imposes the obligation to speak to professional employees. For example, a prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to preserve, and to communicate with the defense of evidence of endorsement in government ownership. Therefore, where there are professional and constitutional obligations, "the need to protect employee speeches is enhanced, the need for broad governmental authorities is likely to be reduced, and standards that can be administered are likely to be available." Breyer adds that in such cases, the Constitution requires special protection from employee remarks, and a "Pickering balancing" test must be applied.
Although Breyer notes that he agrees with much of Souter's analysis, he writes that Souter's constitutional standards do not give enough weight to the "serious managerial and administrative problems" described by the majority. Souter's proposed barrier will not filter many cases, because there are too many issues of public concern; moreover, the speech of many public employees dealing with errors, health, safety, and honesty, and such rules will protect the speech by employees who are involved in almost all public functions. The problem with broad coverage is that the standards spoken by Souter will not avoid the need for justice "to do the balance in the first place."
Next development
In a telephone interview with the San Francisco Chronicle Ceballos said "it puts your average government employee in one difficulty... I think government employees will be more likely to be quiet."
Disappointment among supporters of whistle blowers and First Amendment advocacy is vast. Whistleblower's lawyer, Stephen M. Kohn, called the ruling "one of the biggest setbacks to the complainant in court in 25 years." Under the verdict, Kohn said, public employees - all 22 million of them - have no First Amendment right when they act in official capacity, and in many cases are not protected against retaliation. Kohn estimates that "no less than 90 percent of all complainants will lose their case on the basis of this decision."
Legal blog Balkinization publishes an extensive review of the decision by guest writer Marty Lederman and analysis by blog owner Jack Balkin.
References
Further reading
- Riera-Seivane, Jaime A.,
- de libertad de expresiÃÆ'³n de los empleados pÃÆ'ºblicos (Garcetti v. Ceballos y su the eventual effect on Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.) (" Freedom of speech of general employees (Garcetti v. Ceballos and its effect on Pickering v. Bd of Educ.) "), Rev. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, vol. 66 NÃÆ'º m. 2, Ceiling. 93.
- Riera-Seivane, Jaime A., El golpe ÃÆ' la libertad de expresiÃÆ'³n, Garcetti v. Ceballos ("Spanking Freedom of Speech, Garcetti v. Ceballos"), Ley y Foro, 16 AÃÆ' Â ± o 6, NÃÆ'ºm. 3, Ceiling. 16.
External links
- Text Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 US 410 (2006) available from: CourtListener Findlaw Ã, Google Scholar Justia Oyez The Supreme Court (opinion slip)
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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